Iowa Voting Machines "Totally Nuts"

(Scary. - promoted by desmoinesdem)

The University of Iowa's professor Doug Jones, a world leader in voting machine oversight, has today described the Diebold voting machine audit logs as “just totally nuts.” Diebold machines count most of the votes in Iowa elections. The audit logs are supposed to reveal what the machine has been doing as it proceeds through the stages of ballot reading and counting.

Audit logs came under scrutiny in Humboldt County, California when a public auditing process discovered that votes had not been counted in the official results. Those official totals had come from Diebold (now hiding behind the name Premier) vote counting software. Wired.com interviewed Jones, who said

“These audit logs could give us some assurances [about an election] if they were genuinely designed so that a casual bystander could look at them and understand them,” says Doug Jones, a University of Iowa computer scientist and former chairman of a board that examines and approves voting machines for use in Iowa. “[But] having them cryptic and obscure destroys the value in terms of election transparency.”

So it seems that Diebold logs don't tell everything that happened in the correct order, as we all thought a log was supposed to do. Wired's “Threat Level” reporter Kim Zetter goes on–

The audit logs appear to record only limited types of events on the system and provide no comprehensive record that tracks every event performed by an election official.

Premier didn't respond to a query from Threat Level about the logs. But Jones said the Premier/Diebold system, as far as he knows, provides no single log file that chronologically lists all events in the life of an election.

Instead, he says, the system keeps “lots and lots of different logs” that appear to have been “independently designed by people who didn't talk to each other” and that are incomprehensible to anyone except the vendor. He assumes Premier has documentation explaining how to interpret the logs, but says if it does, the company doesn't share that information with election officials, making independent audits of a voting system difficult if not impossible.

So . . .lots of logs . . .don't talk to each other . . .need documentation to interpret the logs . . .but WAIT—

“From the point of view of actually doing any forensics, it's a mess,” Jones said. “Because you have to understand what all of the logs are saying, and all of the documentation to understand what they're saying are not public documents. I find that truly reprehensible. The idea that you can have this inscrutable document, but that you can't have any document to understand that document, is just totally nuts.”

I know that Iowa auditors are conferring with the Secretary of State about a weak audit bill for the current legislature to consider. “It will be better than nothing,” I was told. Given the “threat level,” I think that is a pretty low standard for a state that wants to be First in the Nation again in 2012. Having fallen for Diebold's disasterous devices despite Jones's best efforts to protect Iowa, we need a strong audit bill. States from Maine to California (literally) are pushing past us.

cross posted at IowaVoters.org

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IowaVoter

  • question

    We had recounts in two Iowa legislative districts this year. (Jeff Danielson won by 22 votes in Senate district 10, and Renee Schulte won by 13 votes in House district 37.) Were those done only by machine, or were there hand counts to verify the accuracy of the original count?

    Neither recount produced a significantly different total for either candidate than the original count.

    • several recounts

      We had more recounts than that.  I know the Danielson race in Black Hawk county was counted by hand, but I don’t know details of the others.  See this account.

  • Diebold

    If we must use Diebold or anyother electronic machine count we need a paper trail.  The ballot booth should print two copies of the ballot.  One for the voter and one for backup.  After each election they should do a hand count on two or three precincts per county.  As long as the hand count agrees with Diebold then fine.  But if their is any difference then we should destroy every Diebold machine and go back to optical scan ballots.  

    • We have a paper trail now

      If you voted in November you had to make your own mark on the paper ballot.  We have no touchscreens anymore. We have already “gone back” to optical scan ballots.

      It’s the counting of the ballots that is a problem, so you are correct about the need for hand count audits.  Tell your legislator you want them done.

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